Pierre Schlag, "Normativity and the Politics of Form," this volume, at 98.
Citation omitted.
3 Paul Campos, "Against Constitutional Theory," this volume, at 139.
4 Steven D. Smith, "Idolatry in Constitutional Interpretation:' this volume, at 189.
Pierre Schlag, "Values;' 6 Yale J.L. & Human. 219 (1994).
6 The Ages of American Law (1974), lll.
P. Bourdieu, Tn Other Words (1990), 178.
2 For a graphic demonstration, see C. M. Yablon, "Forms;'
Cardozo I. Rev. 1348 (199
A. Sarat and W. L. F. Felstiner, "Lawyers and Legal Consciousness: Law Talk in the
Lawyer's Office," 98 Yale L.J. 1663,1685 (1989) (footnotes omitted).
4 See P. Schlag, "'Le Hors de Texte, C'est Moi': The Politics of Form and the Domestic
Cardozo I. Rev. 1631 (1990); P. Schlag, "Normative and Nowhere
43 Stan. L. Rev. 167 (1990).
Notice that the generative metaphorical schema at work here is what Lakoff calls the
path-goal schema"; see G. Lakoff, Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things: What C
Reveal about the Mind (1987), 275. The basic logic of this recursive schema is to go
source to a destination on a path. As Lakoff puts it, "Purposes are understood in t
destinations, and achieving a purpose is understood as passing along a path from a
point to an endpoint" (ibid).
Much of normative legal thought can be understood as structured by this source-p
schema. Teleological ethics are destination oriented, requiring the travelers on the jo
act in ways appropriate to achieve the destination. Deontological ethics, in cont
backward looking and source regarding, requiring the travelers to refer back to w
already transpired on the journey in order to decide what to do at each point.
6 See P. Schlag, "Cannibal Moves: The Metamorphoses of the Legal Distinction," 40
Rev. 929, 930 (1988).
7 For an argument that the "essential difficulties in social policy have more to do with
setting than with problem solving," see D. Schon, "Generative Metaphor: A Perspe
Problem Setting in Social Policy;' in Metaphor and Thought, ed. A. Ortony (198B), 25
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