Notes
Preface
1. Although we have honored requests to protect the anonymity of the staff
aides and their positions in Congress, we have of course kept extensive, carefully
detailed records of each interview, along with a transcript (for those who allowed us
to tape the interview) or detailed interview notes (for those who did not). Our use
of this evidence reflects those materials, attributed when possible, and credited to
“anonymous” when necessary.
Chapter 2: From Problem to Policy
1. Others use the terms “political entrepreneurs” (Schneider and Teske 1992),
“strategic entrepreneurs” (Riker 1980), “public entrepreneurs” (Polsby 1984; Walker
1981), and even “policy champions” (DeGregorio 1997; Roberts 1992) to describe
the same phenomenon.
2. See also Jeon and Haider-Markel (2001), Kingdon (1995), Baumgartner and
Jones (1993), Roberts (1992), Polsby (1984), Cobb and Elder (1983), Walker (1981),
Price (1971), and Schumpeter (1939).
3. Burden (2007) lists personal expertise as a separate factor, which we include
here as part of one’s personal experience.
4. See also Hibbing (2003).
5. In particular, see table 2 in Carter (1986, 335).
6. As Howell and Pevehouse (2007, 36) put it in their discussion of Congress
and the use of force, members of the president’s party are more likely to support
presidential decisions because their worldviews match, they defer to the president’s
presumed information advantage, they have shared electoral fortunes, and they
seek to curry presidential favor.
7. However, as numerous studies suggest, the media’s coverage reflects gov‑
ernment sources and may “index” the tone and direction of the policy debates and
criticisms in the government. In particular, the media are substantially more likely
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