Notes
1
Introduction
1
The questions used to examine each case in this "structured, focused compari-
son" are grouped into four clusters:
(1)
background (antecedents of
u.s.
involve-
ment; groups and countries involved);
(2)
actors (policy makers, interests, and
resources); (3) policy making (who was involved and what patterns occurred
in agenda setting, formulation, legitimation, implementation, and evaluation);
and (4) results (application of the Reagan Doctrine, impact, success, failure,
effect of process on policy).
2
For example, Copson and Cronin
(1987),
Pastor
(1987), R.
Johnson
(1988),
and
Elliott Abrams and Alan Keyes (Lagon
1991, 385-86)
all suggested that the
strategy was developed only to justify aid to the contras, while Rodman
(1994,
259)
maintained that no strategy, consideration, national security study direc-
tive, or national security decision directive embodying the initiative existed
prior to
1985.
3
This is my adaptation ofJones
1984
and Ripley and Franklin
1991.
2
The Reagan Doctrine
1
Ted Carpenter
(1986,
note
1)
suggested that the intellectual roots of the Reagan
Doctrine may be found in the writings of Laurence W. Beilenson (e.g.,
1972,
1984),
who advocated the use of insurgencies against vulnerable Soviet clients.
Not coincidentally, Beilenson was one of Ronald Reagan's friends.
2
On the worldview and ideology of the Reagan administration, see Kegley and
Wittkopf
1982.
3
This quote is from a
31
July
1986
Soviet document, "On Measures to Strengthen
Our Counteractions to the American Policy of Neoglobalism," cited in Garthoff
1994,696-97.
4 Casey had been working on this for some time, as seen in his early policy recom-
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