lest the under lying chronological architectonics of this book be
seen as reinscribing the very same linear, deterministic, and progressive te-
leology that the thinkers in question contest, I conclude without conclud-
ing, and prior to where I began. The decolonized dialectics of Frantz Fanon
and Enrique Dussel exist in de pen dently of George Sorel’s dialectics of class
strug gle; he is not their origin, source, or mandatory point of departure.
While global capitalism and coloniality emerged so jointly as to be nearly
synonymous, and while many decolonial revolutionaries have turned to
Marxism as a weapon, decolonization itself is not an outgrowth of— and
much less does it find its “parentage” in— the class strug gle.1 More impor-
tantly still, a decolonized (and decolonizing) dialectics— understood as a
radical practice and orientation toward strug gle—predates, exceeds, and
exists in de pen dently of even Hegel’s own formulations, in the combative
self- assertion, the making known, of colonized and enslaved peoples.
Without ever having read a word of Hegel, the slave- turned-abolitionist
orator Frederick Douglass would not only enact and delineate the funda-
mental contours of the Hegelian master- slave dialectic with an astonishing
degree of clarity on the basis of nothing but his own lived experience, but
he would also preemptively radicalize that dialectic in a way that foreshad-
owed the thinkers considered here. Douglass was to be broken by the
infamous slave- breaker Edward Covey, a fate that he initially accepted as
his destiny, his ontological reduction— what he calls his “brutification”—
to a level scarcely above the ox that he himself was tasked with breaking:
“break and be broken— such is life.”2 A rationalist like Fanon but a Christian
Previous Page Next Page