1. For Stephen B. Smith, this concern unified Hegel’s theoretical production
while justifying philosophy as a proj ect of reconciliation. Hegel’s Critique of
Liberalism: Rights in Context (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989), 17.
2. This is not to reduce Hegel to his disciples on the Right, and while Fukuyama
is at pains to defend Hegel from the Marxian critique of civil society, he
leans heavi ly on Alexandre Kojève’s “end of history” argument to do so.
Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Simon
and Schuster, 2006 [1992]), 60–65. On Fukuyama as a characteristically
Right Hegelian, see Fredric Jameson, The Hegel Variations: On the Phenom-
enology of Spirit (London: Verso, 2010), 5. To be clear, Hegel is far more
concerned with the dangerous tendencies of the market than his conserva-
tive heirs, but civil society (bürgerliche Gesellschaft) remains nevertheless
a space of mediation, its inevitable imperfection resolved through the
“police” function of the state. G. W. F. Hegel, Ele ments of the Philosophy of
Right, trans. H. B. Nisbet (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991
[1820]), “Section 2: Civil Society,” a subset of which is “The Police.” On the
tendency of civil society to generate poverty, see §§ 241–45; on its tendency
to require colonial expansion, see §§ 246–48. For a nuanced discussion, see
Reinhart Klemens Maurer, “Hegel and the End of History,” in Hegel Myths
and Legends, ed. J. Stewart (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1996),
3. Where Fukuyama would consider such regime changes mere “events,” hardly
noticeable bumps on the ever- smoother road of “universal civil society,”
civil society’s double- role as both mea sure and ambitious means for actively
securing the end of history should be enough to reveal the cynical circularity
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