1 Kennedy, A Nation of Immigrants, 5–6.
2 Ewick and Silbey, The Common Place of Law, 187.
3 Stepan in Evans et al., Bringing the State Back In, 340.
4 Giddens in Held and Thompson, Social Theory of Modern Societies, 256. See also
Agger, Cultural Studies as Critical Theory; Alexander, Action and Its Environments; Silbey,
‘‘Making a Place for the Cultural Analysis of Law.’’
5 McClain in Sucheng Chan, Entry Denied.
6 See Fritz, ‘‘A Nineteenth-Century ‘Habeas Corpus Mill’ ’’; Janisch, ‘‘The Chinese,
the Courts, and the Constitution’’; McClain, ‘‘The Chinese Struggle for Civil Rights in
Nineteenth-Century America’’; McClain, In Search for Equality; Wunder, ‘‘The Chinese and
the Courts in the Pacific Northwest.’’
7 Lee, At America’s Gate; Salyer, Laws Harsh as Tigers.
8 This failure to address the subjects of administrative control pervades much writ-
ing on regulatory enforcement, despite recognition of their centrality to administrative
development. For example, despite Hutter’s stated recognition of the centrality of inter-
action between regulatory agents and the subjects of regulation, her study nonetheless
treats environmental o√enders as passive or static inputs rather than as fluid and re-
active, employing strategies and tactics in response to o≈cers’ initiatives to gain com-
pliance. Hutter, The Reasonable Arm of the Law?, 14–15.
9 De Certeau, The Practice of Everyday Life.
10 Simon, Poor Discipline, 9.
11 Ibid., 10.
12 A recent article by Zuckerman, The Categorical Imperative, suggests a similar mecha-
nism regarding the valuation of companies. Studying the manner in which specialists
value companies for investment purposes, he notes that companies’ need to fit into
identifiable industries in accordance with the criteria of valuation specialists results in a
lower valuation for hybrid companies. Thus, the organization of valuation ends up