1. Among the early discussions see Caillet- Bois, Ensayo sobre el Río de la Plata y la
revolución francesa; Lewin, “La ‘conspiración de los Franceses’ en Buenos Aires
(1795)”; and E. Ortega, El complot colonial.
2. As is true of so much of Argentine historiography Tulio Halperín Donghi’s was
the ﬁrst to explore the economic and political impact of militarization. See for
example his “Revolutionary Militarization in Buenos Aires 1806–1815.”
3. Tulio Halperín Donghi argues that military wages were particularly crucial for
the local- born artisans and laborers, rather than for the Spanish immigrants. As
a result, the militia units whose enlisted ranks were mostly ﬁlled with Spaniards
pulled back from full time service quickly after the defeat of Beresford, while
the native born remained in barracks on full salary. This persisted after the de-
feat of Whitelocke in 1807 and helped to determine the test of strength between
Santiago Liniers and Martín de Álazaga in January 1809. See his Politics, Eco-
nomics, and Society in Argentina in the Revolutionary Period, 143.
1. The monthly wage of master shoemakers fluctuated between three and four
pesos per month in Buenos Aires. This means that the alcalde sought to impose
a fee equal to between four and ﬁve and a half months’ income. agn, División
Colonia, Sección Contaduría, Culto de Buenos Aires, Mercedarios, Convento
Grande de San Ramón, Libros de Gastos, libro III; and agn, Culto de Buenos
Aires, Bethlemitas, Convento y hospital de Santa Catalina, libro de gastos.
2. agn, División Colonia, Sección Gobierno, Justicia, leg. 51, exp. 1461.
3. agn, División Colonia, Sección Gobierno, Interior, leg. 54, exp. 3.
4. agn, División Colonia, Sección Gobierno, Interior, leg. 55, exp. 5, 14–49.
5. Between 1791 and 1800 the Río de la Plata region took 2.7 percent of all slaves
imported to the Americas. Between 1801 and 1810 the region received 6.3 per-
cent. Jeremy Adelman used the universally respected estimates produced by